The Evolution of beliefs and opinions on matters related to marriage and sexual behaviour among French-speaking Catholic Quebecers and English-speaking Protestant Ontarians by Miller, Caia et al.
Canadian Studies in Population, Vol. 33.2, 2006, pp. 209-239 
209 
 
 
 
 
The Evolution of Beliefs and Opinions on Matters related to Marriage  
and Sexual Behaviour among French-speaking Catholic Quebecers  
and English-speaking Protestant Ontarians 
 
 
 
Benoît Laplante 
Caia Miller,
†  
Institut national de la recherche scientifique 
Université du Québec 
Montréal, Québec, Canada 
 
Paskall Malherbe  
Université Marc Bloch 
Strasbourg, France   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The authors argue that the important changes in behaviour related to family and 
sexual life that were seen in Quebec during the second half of the 20th century 
are a consequence of a major transformation of the foundation of the normative 
system shared by the members of Quebec’s main socio-religious group, French-
speaking  Catholics.  Using  data  from  Gallup  polls,  the  authors  compare  the 
evolution of the opinions of French-speaking Quebec Catholics  and English-
speaking Ontario Protestants on matters related to sexual and family behaviour 
from the 1950s to the beginning of the 2000s. The general result is that the 
evolution  of  the  differences  between  the  two  groups  is  compatible  with  the 
hypothesis.  
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Résumé 
Les  auteurs  proposent  d’expliquer  les  importants  changements  qui  se  sont 
produits,  dans  le  Québec  de  la  deuxième  moitié  du  20
e  siècle,  dans  les 
comportements liés à la famille et à la vie sexuelle par  la transformation du 
système  normatif  des  membres  de  son  principal  groupe  socio-religieux,  les 
francophones  catholiques.  À  partir  des  données  de  sondages  Gallup,  ils 
comparent l'évolution des opinions des francophones catholiques du Québec et 
des anglophones protestants de l’Ontario sur des questions liées à la famille et 
au comportement sexuel et de famille des années 1950 à 2000. L’évolution des 
différences entre les deux groupes est compatible avec l’hypothèse. 
 
Mots-clés:  le Canada; le Québec; les normes; la deuxième transition 
démographique 
 
Introduction 
 
The strength of the rise of cohabitation in Quebec and the related strong decline 
in  marriage  have  attracted  the  interest  of  some  demographers  who  have 
documented these phenomena, but none of these researchers has to date given a 
satisfactory explanation of the phenomena. This transformation of Quebecers’ 
behaviour has been related to the second demographic transition (van de Kaa, 
1987),  but  there  is  no  real  explanation  of  why,  if  this  is  the  case,  Quebec 
“lagged” behind the rest of Canada on this path until roughly the end of the 
1960s,  and  then  became  a  “forerunner,”  as  Le  Bourdais  and  Marcil-Gratton 
(1996) put it.  
 
In  their  study  of  the  early  life  transitions  of  Canadian  women,  Ravanera, 
Rajulton and Burch (1998) interpreted Quebec women’s atypical behaviour as 
“a  distinctive  mixture  of  Gallic  sophistication  and  modernity  with  lingering 
traces of a very conservative brand of Catholicism,” which alludes to some form 
of normative distinctiveness but hardly qualifies as a real explanation. In his 
study  of  cohabitation  in  Canada,  Wu  (2000)  leaves  largely  unanalyzed  the 
difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada and, although he describes 
changes over time in the incidence of cohabitation and in the attitudes towards 
it,  he  assumes  that  the  micro-level  processes  leading  to  the  choice  of 
cohabitation, or the attitudes towards it, are stable over time. Lapierre-Adamcyk, 
Le  Bourdais  and  Marcil-Gratton  (1999)  analyze  current  attitudes  towards 
marriage and cohabitation among young Ontarians and Quebecers, but do not 
examine the evolution of such attitudes over time. Bélanger and Turcotte (1999) 
do examine the changes over time in the effects of education and work on the Benoit Laplante, Caia Miller and Paskall Malherbe
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choice of cohabitation or marriage as the form of the first union among Quebec 
women. They show that, contrary to what is assumed by the economic approach 
to human behaviour, these effects change over time. However, as their analysis 
is limited to Quebec, one cannot judge how the pace of these changes compares 
with that seen in Ontario or in other Canadian provinces. Had they made such 
comparisons, they might not have been able to explain any observed differences 
using the economic explanatory framework and the independent variables they 
chose. From a completely different perspective, and relying heavily on Parsons’ 
and Bales’s (1955) work on the family, Dagenais (2000) has examined changes 
in the contemporary family: although he presents his analysis as a general one, 
and as not specific to Quebec, Quebec is the only contemporary society he refers 
to; once  again, this prevents any comparison with the rest of Canada or any 
other society. 
 
Our view, developed in a related paper (Laplante, 2006), is that Quebec’s shift 
in direction and recent rapid progress along the path of what has been called the 
second demographic transition have to be envisioned in the broader framework 
of a major transformation of the foundation of the normative system shared by 
the  members  of  Quebec’s  main  socio-religious  group,  French-speaking 
Catholics. 
 
This paper is part of a research effort in which we look for empirical evidence to 
support  this  claim.  According  to  our  hypothesis,  since  the  1960s,  French-
speaking Quebec Catholics have progressively shifted from a normative system 
based on Catholic morality, similar  to or more  conservative than  that of our 
comparison group, English-speaking Ontario Protestants, to a normative system 
that is not founded on Christian morality. If this is true, it should be possible to 
see traces of that shift in the opinions of French-speaking Quebec Catholics on 
matters related to sexual and family behaviour from the 1950s to the beginning 
of  the  2000s.  More  specifically,  the  opinions  of  French-speaking  Quebec 
Catholics on these matters should have been similar to or more conservative 
than  the  opinions  of  our  comparison  group,  English-speaking  Ontario 
Protestants, at the beginning of this period, whereas they should be more liberal 
by the end of it. 
 
In  this  article,  we  begin  by  describing  the  evolution  of  certain  demographic 
behaviours in Quebec, as compared with Ontario. We present, in a condensed 
form,  the  rationale  for  our  hypothesis.  We  then  formulate  specific  empirical 
hypotheses,  outline  our  data  sources  and  methods,  provide  our  results  and 
present a discussion.  
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Contemporary Behaviours in Quebec and Ontario 
 
From  a  general  point  of  view,  it  is  easy  to  argue  that  when  it  comes  to 
demographic behaviours, Quebec is different from the rest of Canada, which, in 
contrast  to  Quebec,  appears  relatively  homogeneous.  However,  the  “rest  of 
Canada” is not so homogeneous that one should not take into account a number 
of local peculiarities in order to effectively study the full range of differences 
that  may  be  found  there.  When  we  focus  on  the  case  of  Quebec,  Ontario, 
because of  the size of  its population,  its nearby location, the  structure of  its 
economy  and its comparable history, offers a far better comparison  than the 
whole of the rest of Canada. 
 
Table 1 compares family structures in Quebec and Ontario using data from the 
2001 census and provides information about the respective importance, in each 
of the two provinces, of families with  and without children;  it  also provides 
information about the types of unions of couples with children at home. As one 
can see, childless families are slightly more common in Quebec than in Ontario, 
as are lone-parent families. However, the biggest difference between the two 
provinces involves common-law unions.  We  learn from the 2001 census that 
30% of couples live in common-law unions in Quebec, whereas only 11% do so 
in Ontario. We also learn that 21% of Quebec families with children are headed 
by  a  couple  living  in  a  common-law  union,  as  compared  with  only  6%  of 
Ontario families in that category. To put it more clearly, in more than one out of 
four  two-parent  families  in  Quebec,  the  parents  live  in  common-law  unions, 
whereas  this  is  the  case  in  less  than  one  out  of  ten  two-parent  families  in 
Ontario. 
 
Figures  1  to  4  give  an  overview  of  the  evolution  of  certain  demographic 
behaviours  in Quebec  and Ontario over several decades.  Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of the crude marriage rate in Quebec and Ontario from 1950 to 2003. 
From  1950  to  the  mid-1960s,  the  crude  marriage  rate  decreased  in  both 
provinces, and was  always lower in Quebec  than  in Ontario. From the mid-
1960s to the beginning of the 1970s, it increased and remained similar in both 
provinces. The pace of the increase slowed in Quebec at the beginning of the 
1970s. The peak of the increase was reached in the mid-1970s in both provinces. 
The rate then started to steadily decline, with the decrease occurring much more 
quickly in Quebec than in Ontario. As we will see several times in this section, 
long series can only be obtained for simple demographic measures. Some related 
and more refined measures are available for recent years. We thus know that in 
2002, the total first marriage ratio among females under 50 years of age was 
333.7 per 1,000 in Quebec and 558.7 per 1,000 in Ontario, which is 40% lower 
in Quebec than in Ontario. The same ratios for males were 303.4 in Quebec and 
531.1  in  Ontario,  which  is  43%  lower  in  Quebec  than  in  Ontario.  Benoit Laplante, Caia Miller and Paskall Malherbe 
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                                                      Table 1 
Census Families in Private Households by Family Structure and 
Presence of Children, by Provinces and Territories:  2001  
  Quebec  Ontario 
All families     
Without children at home  37.22%  34.79% 
With children at home  62.78%  65.21% 
Two-parent families     
Families of married couples  69.80%  88.96% 
Families of common-law couples  30.20%  11.04% 
Families with children at home     
Families of married couples  52.87%  70.64% 
Families of common-law couples  20.66%  6.00% 
Lone-parent families  26.47%  23.36% 
     
 
 Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Population, authors’ calculation 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the crude divorce rate in Quebec and Ontario 
from 1950 to 2003. We see that until 1970, divorce was uncommon in Quebec 
and the rate was thus lower than in Ontario. The rate increased in both provinces 
from 1970 to 1990, but at a faster pace in Quebec until the last portion of the 
1970s. The rates have been similar in both provinces since the beginning of the 
1990s and have tended to decrease. Again, we may use a more refined measure 
for recent years: in this case, the 30-year total divorce rate per 1,000 marriages. 
This measure is built in pretty much the same fashion as the total fertility rate, 
and can be interpreted as the proportion of existing marriages that would end in 
divorce in their first 30 years if the current divorce ratios per years of marriage 
duration were applied to them. In 2002, the 30-year total divorce rate per 1,000 
marriages  was  476  in  Quebec  and  349  in  Ontario,  which  is  36%  higher  in 
Quebec than in Ontario. In other words, the crude marriage rate is not the best 
way to compare the two provinces because fewer people marry in Quebec than 
in Ontario, but a higher proportion of these married people divorce in Quebec 
than in Ontario.  
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Figure 3 reports the rate of induced abortions per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 in 
Quebec and Ontario from 1970 to 2003. These rates remained lower in Quebec 
than  in  Ontario  until  the  beginning  of  the  1990s,  were  similar  from  the 
beginning of the 1990s up to the final years of the century, and then remained 
high in Quebec while they decreased in Ontario. A somewhat different measure, 
the ratio of induced abortions per 100 live births, gives a sharper picture of the 
current difference: in 2002, the ratio of induced abortions per 100 live births was 
42.6 in Quebec and 29.7 in Ontario, which is 43% higher in Quebec than in 
Ontario. 
 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the total fertility rate in Quebec and Ontario 
from 1950 to 2003. From 1950 to the beginning of the 1960s, the rate remained 
stable in Quebec and was higher than in Ontario, where it increased. In both 
provinces, the rate decreased quite steadily from the beginning of the 1960s to 
the beginning of the 1980s. During this period, it was lower in Quebec than in 
Ontario. From the beginning of the 1980s to 2003, the rate remained quite stable 
in Ontario, while it first decreased and then increased in Quebec. Since the mid-
1990s, the rate has been similar in both provinces. In 2002, the total fertility rate 
was 1,460.5 in Quebec and 1,474.1 in Ontario, which is just under 1% lower in 
Quebec than in Ontario.  
 
In a nutshell, although people in Quebec marry less, and divorce more if they 
marry, and although Quebec women abort more than Ontario women, women in 
both provinces give birth to roughly the same number of children.  
 
The overall picture of the current situation regarding family-related behaviours 
in Quebec can thus be summarized as follows. In this province—where 83% of 
the people report that they are Catholic—30% of couples are not married, almost 
half of the marriages end in divorce, 28% of couples with children at home are 
not  married,  and,  very  roughly,  three  out  of  ten  pregnancies  are  ended  by 
induced  abortion.  All  of  these  figures  are  higher  than  in  the  neighbouring 
province of Ontario, where only 35% of the people are Catholic and 16% say 
that  they  have  no  religion.  So  the  big  question  is:  How  is  it  that  the  only 
Canadian province where the vast majority of the people say they are Catholic is 
also the province where people manage their sexual, reproductive and family 
lives in ways that are the least compatible with Catholic morality? 
 
Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain why people choose common-
law  union  over  marriage.  Some  of  them,  such  as  the  selection  hypothesis, 
hypotheses based on the cost of children and the expected cost of separation, and 
hypotheses in which common-law union is seen as a “budget form” of marriage, 
could be discussed while looking for an explanation of this difference between 
two provinces that also  differ  in  some  aspects  of  their  economies  and  legal  
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 systems,  although  a  recent  study  of  demographic  and  socioeconomic 
differences  between  cohabiting  and  married  couples  in  Quebec  and  Canada 
(Kerr,  Moyser  and  Beaujot,  2006)  shows  quite  convincingly  that  the  choice 
between the two forms of union is not related in the same way to socioeconomic 
characteristics in Quebec as it is in the rest of Canada. 
 
However, there are relatively few hypotheses about the decision to divorce, the 
most  common  being  that  people  who  had  bad  experiences  in  childhood  or 
experienced the divorce of their parents are more prone to divorce. But it is hard 
to see how such psychosocial explanations could be used to explain differences 
in divorce rates in the two provinces. Finally, we do not know of any proposed 
explanation of the use of abortion as a method of contraception that does not 
explicitly involve moral norms. In other words, it seems difficult to imagine an 
explanation of the pattern of these differences in behaviour between the  two 
provinces that does not directly look into what sustains the norms, values and 
beliefs that guide people in their behaviour in family-related and sexual matters, 
and into the process through which these norms, values and beliefs change when 
behaviours change so drastically over time, and in such a different way in two 
societies that are part of the same country and have relatively similar standards 
of living.  
 
 
An Explanation based on Religion  
as a Shaper of Social Groups 
 
The fact that Quebec ceased to be a Catholic society during what is known as 
the Quiet Revolution and that Catholic French Canadians from Quebec started to 
move away, in their daily lives and especially in their sexual and family lives, 
from the morality of the Catholic Church during this period has already been 
noted by several demographers (e.g. Beaujot, 2000). However, the underlying 
mechanisms and significance of this co-occurrence are not yet fully understood. 
Our view is that the differences in demographic behaviour between Quebec and 
Ontario—or between Quebec and the rest of Canada—that developed over the 
last four decades should be envisioned  in the broader framework of a major 
transformation  of  the  foundation  of  the  normative  system  shared  by  the 
members of Quebec’s main socio-religious group, French-speaking Catholics. 
 
As we argue elsewhere (Laplante, 2006), these differences can be explained, at 
least in part, by the fact that almost all of Quebec’s French-speaking population 
during the 1960s belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, at a time when the 
local  Catholic  Church  was  changing  in  one  important  way  while  failing  to 
change in another equally important one. More specifically, we argue that the 
Church  authorities’  refusal  either  to  change  their  doctrine  on  marriage  and 
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sexuality  or  to  allow  the  laity  to  play  a  decisional  role  in  the  definition  of 
doctrine and the orientation of pastoral activities gave Quebec Roman Catholics 
a strong motive for abandoning the Christian tradition as the provider of moral 
guidelines on sexual and family matters; at the same time, the withdrawal of 
local  Roman  Catholic  authorities  from  the  set  of  institutions  that  structured 
people’s lives “from the cradle to the grave” made it possible for Quebecers to 
actually abandon this tradition. 
 
As explained by  Baum (1990),  the  Roman  Catholic  Church’s main tendency 
since  the  19th  century  had  been  to  resist  the  widespread  movement  towards 
democratization  of  its  political  structures  and  to  affirm  the  Church  as  a 
monarchy; the adoption of the dogma of papal infallibility, in 1870, was the 
acme of  this  trend.  The Church’s authority had always been  centralized but, 
since 1870, the definition of the magisterium on moral theology has practically 
rested  in  the  sole  person  of  the  head  of  the  Church  (Mahoney,  1987). 
Theological  and  moral  doctrine  has  become  highly  intellectualized,  and 
theology, as a discipline, is held to be a science in the strictest sense (Ratzinger, 
1987). Important matters of faith and morality, and not only the organization of 
the  Church, are expressed as rules of  law—the  Canon Law, which binds all 
Roman Catholics. 
 
Although all Western Christian churches have inherited the same basic theology 
and  moral  doctrine,  the  Protestant  and  Catholic  Churches  differ  on  two 
important matters in regard to the topic discussed here.  
 
The first difference is that, although mainstream Protestant churches kept most 
of the prevailing traditional Christian moral doctrine at least until the beginning 
of the 20th century, from the start they all differed from Catholicism on one 
topic: divorce. Divorce is permitted by all Protestant churches and, in most of 
them, remarriage is also allowed and even encouraged (Phillips, 1988). In the 
wake  of  the  Reformation,  the  State  seized  the  Church’s  jurisdiction  over 
marriage and related topics in both the civil and religious spheres (Kitchin, 2002 
[1912]).  Thus,  in  countries  where  the  Reformation  prevailed,  ecclesiastical 
courts disappeared, and a divorce granted by a State court, parliament or the 
sovereign himself (or herself) dissolved the marriage both as a contract and as a 
religious  bond.  As  long  as  divorce  was  an  exceptional  occurrence,  these 
differences  remained  of  little  consequence.  In  Canada,  the  context  changed 
somewhat  when  the  number  of  couples  requesting  separation  or  divorce 
increased  among  Protestants  as  well  as  Catholics,  and  when  the  Canadian 
Parliament  made  divorce  easier.  From  then  on,  what  had  been  of  little 
consequence became a huge difference: Protestants were able to get a divorce 
that put an end to their marriage as both a civil and a religious bond, whereas   221
Catholics were able to get a divorce that had civil effects but nevertheless kept 
them married and unable to remarry in their own religion. 
  
The  second  difference  is  that  Protestant  churches  have  moved  away  from 
Catholicism’s  centralist  trend  and  have  reinstated  the  autonomy  of  national 
churches, which never disappeared in Eastern Orthodoxy. Even in the Anglican 
Church, the closest to Catholicism, national synods may or may not enforce the 
canons of the Church of England. Furthermore, in the Protestant world, theology 
and moral theology are areas of debate, and whatever is accepted as right by the 
relevant  collegial  authority  becomes  right.  Decentralization  and  a  belief  that 
matters of faith and morality are to be defined by the assembly of believers in its 
historical circumstances have given Protestant churches the latitude to deal with 
matters of morality in a wide variety of ways. The important point is that this 
latitude existed and was used, and is still used, to accommodate a wide range of 
conceptions  of  moral  behaviour  that  make  it  possible  to  keep  divorce, 
remarriage of the divorced, contraception, women ministers, and even, in some 
cases, homosexuality and abortion within the realm of religious morality. 
 
No  such  latitude  existed  within  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  the  1960s. 
Although we have no direct evidence from interviews or published material, it is 
not  unreasonable  to  imagine  that  Quebec  Roman  Catholics  might  have  been 
satisfied if their Church had followed, at least with respect to contraception, a 
path and a timing similar to the course taken by the Anglican Church between 
1920 and 1958 (Noonan, 1965). The Roman Catholic Church did not. 
 
Protestants, who all had the power to define religious morality within some form 
of  deliberative  body,  were  able  to  keep  adapting  this  morality  to  the  new 
realities. From the Protestant perspective, religious morality is open to change 
and does change. This has two consequences. First, this makes it possible both 
to remain within the Church or retain religious beliefs and to live according to 
an  updated  religious  ethic,  either  because  one’s  particular  church  or 
congregation has updated its moral doctrine, or is likely to do so, or because an 
equivalent Protestant church or congregation has or will have done so. Second, 
by  keeping  religion  relevant  to  such  issues,  this  continues  to  legitimate  the 
control  of  sexual  and  reproductive  behaviour  by  churches  and,  more 
importantly,  by  the  community.  Within  the  Protestant  world,  the  act  of 
matrimony  is  relevant  as  an  orderly  moral  event  although,  in  the  Protestant 
doctrine, as in the Eastern Orthodox doctrine, marriage is not a sacrament in the 
sense that it is in the Roman Catholic Church.  
 
More importantly, this deepening of the normative gap between the Catholic and 
the  Protestant  worlds  happened  at  a  time  when  almost  all  of  the  institutions 
structuring the everyday lives of French-speaking Roman Catholic Quebecers 
Benoit Laplante, Caia Miller and Paskall MalherbeThe Evolution of Beliefs and Opinions as Matters related to Marriage and 
Sexual Behaviour among French-speaking Catholic Quebecers and 
 English-speaking Protestant Ontarions 
  222
“from the cradle to the grave” were changing. As shown in recent scholarship 
focusing on the intellectual history of the Quebec Church before and during the 
Quiet  Revolution  (Warren  and  Meunier,  1999;  Meunier  and  Warren,  2002; 
Gauvreau, 2005), these institutions either had been handed over to the Quebec 
government by the religious communities that had owned and managed them for 
centuries, as in the case of health and education, or had simply abandoned their 
affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church, as in the case of labour unions and 
credit unions, with all of this occurring as part of the internal dynamics of the 
Church rather than as the result of a Quebec government initiative. In less than 
ten years, the Roman Catholic Church’s authority and influence over all of these 
institutions  ended  completely,  and  the  institutions  became  officially  non-
confessional.  As  a  result,  for  the  first  time  in  Quebec’s  history  since  the 
Conquest, not being in conformity with the Roman Catholic Church ceased to 
have practical consequences for one’s entitlement to health, education and a host 
of other services related to everyday life or important occasions. 
 
In other words, the Catholic Church in Quebec gave up its power over these 
institutions,  and  its  most  obvious  and  effective  means  of  controlling  its 
members, at the same time as the Holy See was tightening its control over the 
definition of right and wrong and using it to ensure that the doctrine would not 
change. This combination created a situation inviting Quebecers to act as though 
the Church and its doctrine were no longer relevant. Given the circumstances, 
Quebecers chose to accept the invitation, and began treating the Church, and 
religion as well, as irrelevant in matters of family and sexual life. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
According to our general hypothesis, since the 1960s, French-speaking Quebec 
Catholics have progressively shifted from a normative system based on Catholic 
morality, similar to or more conservative than that of our comparison group, 
English-speaking Ontario Protestants, to a normative system that is not founded 
on Christian morality. If this is true, it should be possible to see traces of that 
shift in the opinions of French-speaking Quebec Catholics on matters related to 
sexual and family behaviour from the 1950s to the beginning of the 2000s. More 
specifically, the opinions of French-speaking Quebec Catholics on these matters 
should have been similar to or more conservative than the opinions of English-
speaking  Ontario  Protestants  at  the  beginning  of  this  period,  whereas  they 
should be more liberal by the end of it. 
 
The main problem in such an endeavour is, of course, the availability of data. As 
detailed in the next section, we use data from Gallup polls conducted from 1957 
onwards, which enables us to follow  the opinions of  the  two groups we  are   223  
interested in over more than 40 years. The main limitation with these data is the 
availability of long series of questions on the same topic. Gallup questionnaires 
typically include questions on topics that are known to be of public interest or 
political  relevance  at  the  time  of  the  survey.  Although  some  questionnaires 
included questions about free love and related matters, we were unable to find 
questions from which it would have been reasonable to build a series on the 
acceptance  of  common-law  union.  We  were  able  to  find  questions  on  the 
acceptance of  contraception from the mid-1960s to  the  mid-1970s, which is, 
however, a rather short span for our purposes. There are only three topics related 
to our interests for which it proved possible to build long series of questions: 
religious attendance, acceptance of abortion, and acceptance of homosexuality. 
The series on religious attendance ranges from 1957 to 1999, while the series on 
the  acceptance  of  abortion  and  homosexuality  range  from  the  mid-1960s  to 
2000.  
 
Religious attendance is not an opinion but in fact a behaviour. Given that this 
behaviour is an indicator of the importance that people give to religion in their 
lives, that such a topic is clearly related to our area of interest, and that we do 
not know of any other data source that provides such a long series of data on this 
topic and for the two groups we are interested in, we chose to use this survey 
topic.  
 
Homosexuality is not a demographic behaviour; but a high level of acceptance 
of  homosexuality  within  a  group  is  clearly  an  indicator  that  this  group  has 
moved away from the Catholic doctrine that strongly rejects homosexuality as 
part of its doctrine of natural law seen as the foundation of moral law in sexual 
matters. 
 
The level of acceptance of abortion is the only series that is perfectly suited to 
our hypothesis, as it is related as directly as possible to the use of abortion as a 
contraceptive  method,  and  as  acceptance  of  abortion  is  strongly  rejected  by 
Catholic morality. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
We  compare  the  evolution  of  the  opinions  of  French-speaking  Catholic 
Quebecers  and  English-speaking  Protestant  Ontarians  on  matters  related  to 
marriage  and sexual behaviour using data from Gallup polls  conducted from 
1957  onwards  and  available  to  university  researchers  through  the  Carleton 
University  Library  Data  Centre  (see  Bibby,  1987,  2002,  and  Gallup  and 
Lindsay, 1999, for examples of similar uses).  
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We use  the data for Ontario and Quebec from 86 different pools;  each pool 
provides around 600 cases. The question on religion virtually did not change 
over  time.  Until  January  1959,  the  question  on  religion  was  “Do  you  mind 
telling me if you are Roman Catholic, Protestant or Jewish?,” with “Other” as a 
possible  answer. The  question  changed  slightly  in  January  1959  and  became 
“Now for a question on religion.  What is your religious preference—Protestant, 
Roman Catholic, or Jewish?,” with “No religious preference” as a new possible 
answer. 
 
The  data  from  the  pools  are  poststratified  and  weighted  according  to 
contemporary  censuses.  We  use  questions  on  the  respondents’  opinions  on 
religious  attendance,  contraception,  homosexuality  and  abortion.  Answers  to 
these questions are recoded so as to contrast all levels of traditional opinions 
with all levels of liberal opinions, while separating out alternative answers such 
as “qualified,” “no opinion” and “refused to answer”. Analyses are conducted 
using multinomial logit models, and using the liberal answer as the reference 
category of the dependent variable.  
 
Models have been estimated twice, first using province of residence, religion 
and language as distinct variables and then combining them to form a single 
multiple categories variable.  These operations allowed us  to test whether the 
effects of these variables were simply additive or, on the contrary, reflected the 
existence of distinct social groups defined by the combination of province of 
residence, religion and language. In all cases, Ontario, Protestant and English 
were used as the reference categories of the independent variables. All models 
included other presumably relevant variables, such as sex, age and education, 
the effects of which were thus controlled for. Tests were adjusted to take into 
account unequal sampling and, as much as possible, design effect. In the cases 
where tests show that  answers  are distributed as  if there  were distinct social 
groups defined by language, religion and province of residence, the estimates 
associated with the French-speaking Catholic Quebecers category are estimates 
of the odds of French-speaking Catholic Quebecers providing answers of any 
type but the liberal answer, relative to the odds of English-speaking Protestant 
Ontarians providing a liberal answer. 
 
 
Results 
 
The tests show that aggregating province of residence, religion and language 
consistently  provides  a  statistically  significant,  better  explanation  of  the 
distribution  of  answers  than  assuming  that  the  effects  of  these  variables  are 
simply  additive.  Thus,  on  matters  related  to  marriage  and  sexual  behaviour,   225
Canadian society does in fact appear to be structured in groups defined by the 
combination of political territory, language and religion. 
 
Estimates of the numerous regression-like models are reported in graphs (see 
Figures 5 to 8) that show the evolution over time in the odds of French-speaking 
Catholic Quebecers providing a conservative or some alternative answer rather 
than a liberal one relative to the odds of English-speaking Protestant Ontarians 
providing corresponding answers. The questions we are interested in are spread 
over time in an almost erratic manner. The intervals of the “time” scale are thus 
unequal; our attempts to impose equal intervals on the figures were not very 
helpful. 
 
Religious attendance (Figure 5). Religious attendance is commonly known to 
have dropped sharply among French-speaking Quebec Catholics after 1967, but 
our  data  show  that  their  level  of  attendance  remained  higher  than  that  of 
English-speaking Ontario Protestants until 1991. The level was apparently lower 
among  French-speaking  Quebec  Catholics  than  English-speaking  Ontario 
Protestants  in  1997,  but  both  groups  showed  similar  levels  of  attendance  in 
1999.  
 
Contraception  (Figure  6).  The  series  stops  in  1975.  Throughout  the  period, 
French-speaking  Quebec  Catholics  consistently  had  a  higher  probability  of 
providing a more conservative opinion. However, from 1967 onwards, they also 
had  a  higher  probability  of  either  giving  a  qualified  answer  or  refusing  to 
answer. Such a pattern of opinions can be interpreted as reflecting a period of 
division of opinion, as some people maintain the traditional view while others 
either provide some kind of “middle of the road” opinion or simply refuse to 
admit that they do not agree with the opinion that still prevails in their group.  
 
Homosexuality  (Figure  7).  Questions  were  asked  on  homosexuality  in  1968, 
when the federal Parliament removed this behaviour from the Criminal Code, 
and were asked once again in 1977, and then regularly through the 1990s and in 
2000, presumably because questions related to homosexual rights, such as social 
benefits for same-sex partners, adoption by same-sex couples, and homosexual 
marriage, were being publicly debated. The overall trend indicates that French-
speaking  Quebec  Catholics  seemed  to  have  been  more  tolerant  towards 
homosexuality from the onset of the series, which, unfortunately, starts after the 
time at which, according to our hypothesis, their opinion should have started to 
shift.  From  1994  to  2000,  French-speaking  Quebec  Catholics  clearly  held  a 
more  liberal  opinion  on  homosexuality  than  English-speaking  Ontario 
Protestants. 
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Abortion  (Figure  8).  The  overall  trend  is  the  one  we  expected,  although  the 
pattern also seems to reflect differences in the rhythm at which the opinions 
shifted in both groups. Until the mid-1970s, French-speaking Quebec Catholics 
clearly  held  a  more  traditional  opinion  than  English-speaking  Ontario 
Protestants. In 1975 and 1983, French-speaking Quebec Catholics were more 
likely than English-speaking Ontario Protestants to provide a more traditional 
answer  or  a  qualified  one.  This  likely  indicates  that  the  opinion  of  French-
speaking  Quebec  Catholics  was  moving  towards  a  level  of  acceptance  of 
abortion  similar  to  that  of  English-speaking  Ontario  Protestants.  French-
speaking Quebec Catholics were still more likely to provide a qualified opinion 
in 1989. By 1991, they were less likely to provide a qualified opinion and, by 
1995,  they  were  less  likely  to  provide  a  conservative  opinion.  This  new 
difference between the two groups becomes blurred in the following years. The 
most likely explanation is that, after 1995, English-speaking Ontario Protestants 
had reached the level of acceptance of abortion that French-speaking Quebec 
Catholics had reached a few years before. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Our general hypothesis is that Quebec’s relatively rapid progress along the path 
of what seems to be the second demographic transition is a consequence of a 
major transformation of the foundation of the normative system shared by the 
members of Quebec’s main socio-religious group, French-speaking Catholics. 
Using data from Gallup polls, we searched for traces of that shift in the opinions 
of French-speaking Quebec Catholics on matters related to sexual and family 
behaviour  from  the  1950s  to  the  beginning  of  the  2000s.  We  expected  the 
opinions of French-speaking Quebec Catholics on these matters to have been 
similar  to  or  more  conservative  than  the  opinions  of  our  comparison  group, 
English-speaking  Ontario  Protestants,  at  the  beginning  of  this  period,  and  to 
have been more liberal by the end of it. Given the limitations of the data, we 
were  restricted  to  four  topics:  religious  attendance,  opinion  on  the  use  of 
contraception, tolerance towards homosexuality, and opinion on abortion. 
 
The  general  result  is  that  the  changes  that  can  be  seen  in  these  data  are 
compatible with our general hypothesis. Over a 40-year period,  the religious 
attendance of French-speaking Quebec Catholics decreased and became, for a 
time, lower than the level of religious attendance of English-speaking Ontario 
Protestants; in recent years, the levels of religious attendance of the two groups 
are found to be similar. The opinion of French-speaking Quebec Catholics on 
contraception  seems  to  have  been  starting  to  shift  from clearly conservative 
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 towards  a  more  liberal  opinion  during  the  1970s.  By  the  1990s,  French-
speaking  Quebec  Catholics  were  more  tolerant  towards  homosexuality  than 
English-speaking Ontario Protestants. While French-speaking Quebec Catholics 
clearly held more conservative opinions on abortion in the 1960s, by 1995 they 
had a more liberal opinion than English-speaking Ontario Protestants. 
  
The  main  limitation  of  this  analysis  is  obviously  the  availability  of  data. 
Although we had access to Gallup polls from 1953 to 2000, we were not able to 
build more than four series of questions related to the topics we were studying. 
Only two of these series, religious attendance and opinion on abortion, cover the 
largest portion of the period we are interested in. Only one, opinion on abortion, 
is  exactly  the  kind  of  series  we  were  looking  for.  Further  research  would 
definitely be helpful, if the data existed to conduct this research. 
 
This being said, these results on the evolution of the opinions of the two groups 
as well as the current differences between Quebec and Ontario and the evolution 
of the behaviours we report in the introduction all provide material to further 
develop our initial hypothesis.  
 
In a few words, we find traces of a process in which the opinions of one group, 
English-speaking Protestant Ontarians, slowly change from traditional to non-
traditional,  whereas  the  opinions  of  another  group,  French-speaking  Catholic 
Quebecers, rapidly change from very traditional to very non-traditional. We link 
these changes in opinions to the different processes through which each of the 
two groups managed the relation between their religion and the new realities that 
emerged  over  the  period  we  are  examining.  English-speaking  Protestant 
Ontarians, who were largely mainline Protestants during this period, were able 
to use the power or influence the faithful had within their churches to adapt their 
religious morality to the new realities. This process is a continuous one, which, 
as religious morality evolves, allows the believer to keep the Christian tradition 
as the intellectual foundation of the norms he or she lives by. French-speaking 
Catholic  Quebecers  were  facing  the  same  new  realities  as  English-speaking 
Protestant Ontarians; but the combination, within the Roman Catholic Church, 
of  centralized  ecclesiastical  and  moral  authority  and  the  heavy  reliance  on 
religious rationalism in matters of morality hampered the faithful’s adaptation of 
religious morality to the new realities, and thus created a situation in which the 
individual  had  to  choose  between  religious  belief  and  norms  of  behaviour 
adapted  to  the  new  realities.  Unlike  English-speaking  Ontario  Protestants, 
French-speaking Quebec Catholics could not have both. Circumstances made it 
possible  for  French-speaking  Quebec  Catholics  to  choose  the  contemporary 
norms over their traditional religious beliefs. One practical consequence of their 
choice was that almost immediately, the intellectual foundations of morality and 
norms, as well as the intellectual legitimacy of a number of legal institutions 
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(e.g.  marriage,  the  criminalization  of  homosexuality  and  abortion,  etc.), 
disappeared.  
 
To fully appreciate the significance of such a choice, it may be useful to contrast 
it with some related changes that occurred during the Reformation and during 
the French Revolution. The Reformation was conducted with the Lutheran idea 
that  the  Christian  nations  would  be  better  at  defending  Christianity  than  the 
Roman  Court.  Basically,  the  Reformation  transferred  religious  power  to  the 
State, while keeping most of the Christian tradition and most of the Canon Law 
as  it  existed  at  the  time  of  the  transfer.  It  is  true  that  religious  orders  were 
dismantled, priests were allowed to marry, and divorce was authorized in limited 
circumstances. However, contraception, homosexuality and abortion remained 
sins and crimes, as did marital life outside of wedlock, and children born out of 
wedlock remained religiously  and legally  illegitimate.  With the  Reformation, 
Church  and  State  became  united  as  they  never  had  been  since  the  dawn  of 
Christianity. In  this respect,  the French  Revolution did the exact opposite: it 
threw Christianity out of the State. But it did this while keeping most of the 
Christian tradition and most of the implementation of this tradition in civil and 
criminal law. It is true that divorce was authorized—to be repealed during the 
Restauration—as  was  adoption,  which  was  then  almost  as  abhorred  by  the 
Catholic  Church  as  divorce.  However,  contraception,  homosexuality  and 
abortion remained crimes, marital life outside of wedlock was still a disorderly 
conduct from the viewpoint of civil law, and children born out of wedlock were 
still  legally illegitimate.  To  make it possible to keep all  of these norms and 
institutions inherited from the Christian tradition within the context of a legal 
system  that  was  explicitly  not  founded  on  Christian  morality,  the  French 
Revolution provided its own version, a laicized version, of the “natural law” that 
Catholic scholars had developed over the centuries in their attempts to reconcile 
faith with reason. Except for divorce and adoption, all that was forbidden or 
prescribed on religious grounds remained forbidden or prescribed, but on purely 
rationalized grounds. Through laicization, the Christian God, as the source of 
moral law, was replaced by something much akin to the Stoic logos. 
 
When  English-speaking  Ontario  Protestants  were  confronted  with  the  new 
realities  of  the  second  half  of  the  20
th  century,  they  did  as  most  mainline 
Protestants did in the rest of the world: they used the power they had within their 
churches to move their religious morality in the direction the world was taking. 
French-speaking Quebec Catholics could not do such a thing: they had to choose 
between the immutable Catholic morality and the new realities. Once they had 
chosen the new realities, they could not rely on the intellectual device the French 
Revolution had invented as a substitute for Christian belief, because the device 
had never been imported in Canada. 
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Laicization  is  not  secularization.  Unlike  secularization  or  industrialization, 
laicization is not a large-scale and encompassing social process, but rather an 
intellectual  construction  and  a  political  project  embodied  in  law.  As  an 
intellectual construction, it legitimizes the involvement of the State as a non-
religious institution and the expulsion of the Church—and of religion—from the 
institutions that organize people’s lives and provide services that, in  Western 
history,  were  long  the  province  of  the  Church  (e.g.  registration  of  births; 
legitimization, registration and dissolution of marriages; management of schools 
and  hospitals).  It  legitimizes  the  fact  that,  through  laicization  and  the  legal 
structure that implements it, the institutions that are associated with birth and 
matrimony become purely civil concerns and purely the concerns of the State. In 
the many countries where the civil law implements the principles of laicization, 
registration  of  births  is  mandatory  and  is  typically  a  parental  responsibility; 
religious marriage has no civil effect and the law requires that the civil marriage 
be performed before the religious ceremony; and birth and marriage certificates 
are issued by the State. These prescriptions relative to identity and marriage are 
the most important practical implementations and the most obvious evidence 
and most common source of teaching of the view that marriage and other related 
institutions are not intrinsically religious. Such prescriptions are applied in most 
European and American countries, with the notable exception of Canada and the 
United States.  
 
In  Canada,  until  the  answer  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  the  Reference  of  the 
Governor General in Council on same-sex marriage in 2004, matrimony was 
constitutionally an intrinsically religious matter. In Quebec, as in the rest of 
Canada, religious marriage had and still has  civil effects, which makes civil 
marriage  largely  irrelevant.  In  Quebec,  until  the  1990s,  the  only  official 
certificate of identity a Catholic could get, even from civil authorities, was a 
copy  of  the  baptismal  certificate.  If  all  of  this  were  not  enough  to  make  it 
obvious to French-speaking Catholic Quebecers that marriage and birth were 
intrinsically  religious  matters,  Catholic  children  were  educated  in  Catholic 
schools, whether public or private, where they were taught that matrimony and 
baptism were sacraments and where they had very few opportunities to learn 
about laicization. Thus, when French-speaking Catholic Quebecers decided to 
stop following the moral teachings of the Catholic Church, they truly faced a 
void: they knew they wanted divorce and contraception to be morally right, but 
they suddenly lacked any intellectual foundation for such new moral norms. 
 
As far as the authors know, what French-speaking Catholic Quebecers now use 
as the intellectual foundation of their moral thinking has not yet been seriously 
studied. A few facts make it clear that whatever intellectual foundation they use, 
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its original form or laicized. We will limit our illustration of this to three areas: 
cohabitation, the legitimacy of children, and gender equality. 
 
One  of  the  striking  and  puzzling  facts  about  cohabitation  among  French-
speaking Quebecers is that it has turned into an accepted and practical way of 
managing long-term  as well  as short-term relationships,  and an accepted  and 
practical way of raising a family. In very simple terms, this means that among 
French-speaking  Quebecers,  most  of  them  of  Catholic  origin,  the  dominant 
belief is that the intervention of authorities, whether this means the State or the 
Churches, in the formation or dissolution of unions has little legitimacy, whether 
for rationalistic or religious motives. This is clear evidence of a very direct break 
from Christian tradition.  
 
The civil law of most if not all Western nations has long implemented the notion 
that children born outside of wedlock were illegitimate, which basically meant 
that they had no inheritance rights. Provisions to this effect were repealed from 
the Quebec Civil Code in the 1980s. There is now no legal difference between 
children  born  from  married  or  unmarried  parents,  whether  the  parents  live 
together or not. Filiation is not conditional on marriage. Such a rule of filiation 
obviously facilitates the turning of cohabitation into a practical way of raising a 
family. Implementation of such a rule in civil law is, again, clear evidence of a 
very direct break from Christian tradition. 
 
The  Christian  tradition  has  long  been  associated  with  the  idea  that  women 
should yield to men, and French civil law was especially strict in its enforcement 
of this rule, even in its laicized version. Although gender equality is in no way a 
topic  specific  to  Quebec,  several  scholars  have  noted  that  feminism  has  had 
more influence in Quebec than in other places, especially in the evolution of law 
and norms. In today’s world, there is no foundation for the idea that women 
should yield  to men,  except  in tradition. In the  Western  world, the religious 
beliefs of Christianity—if believed to be true and of supernatural origin, or if 
believed to follow from natural law, as in their laicized version—are the only 
intellectual  foundation  for  the  legal  subjection  of  women.  It  is  tempting  to 
suggest that in a post-industrialized Western society where most people decided 
to abandon the Christian tradition as a moral guideline almost overnight, gender 
equality, as a legal and practical issue, should have moved forward more quickly 
than  in  comparable  societies  where  Christian  tradition  remained  a  legitimate 
reference  for  legislators  and  courts  of  justice.  If  this  interpretation  of  what 
happened in Quebec is correct, feminism would be an intermediate variable in 
the process that changed the opinions, norms and behaviour of French-speaking 
Quebecers. The big change would be  the break from Christian  tradition as a 
source of moral direction. 
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Dagenais  (2000)  has  proposed  a  somewhat  related  but  very  different 
interpretation  of  the  transformation  of  family-related  values,  norms  and 
behaviour in Quebec. He basically says that Quebecers have moved away from 
the modern form of the family as described by Parsons and Bales (1955) and are 
now living with a dysfunctional “post-modern” view of the family that does not 
ensure the reproduction of society because it does not lead to replacement level 
fertility and does not provide an appropriate environment for the socialization of 
children. We cannot fully discuss Dagenais’ ideas here, but several comments 
are  in  order.  First,  most  of  his  historical  argumentation  does  not  survive 
Thornton’s  (2005)  synthesis,  which  makes  it  clear  that  the  so-called  modern 
Western family has existed at least since the 13th century. Second, Dagenais’ 
analysis of the changes that occurred in family-related matters in Quebec says 
almost nothing about religious aspects and ignores contemporary research on the 
Quiet Revolution. And lastly, his assessment of current Quebec society is based 
on a never-stated but pervasive belief that the rationalized order of natural law 
and laicization, and the modern form of the family that is part of that order, are 
unsurpassable.  Whether  the  current  organization  of  society  can  support  the 
reproduction of the species is not a new topic (e.g. Davis, 1997 [1937]); and 
there  are  reasons  to  believe  that,  without  the  clearly  natalist  provisions  of 
Christianity or its laicized version, it is unclear why people, in the world we live 
in, would decide to have a child or to have more than one. We do not dispute 
that these questions are of utmost importance, but focusing on them does not 
help us to understand why and how beliefs, values and behaviours change over 
time and at a different pace in different societies. 
 
This  leads us to a discussion of whether  the process we  see among  French-
speaking Catholic Quebecers can truly be considered as a somewhat accelerated 
form of the second demographic transition. As one of our reviewers pointed out, 
although some of the statistics we report in the introduction support the idea, one 
statistic definitely does not: that is, the fact that the current total fertility rates are 
similar in Quebec and Ontario. If the differences between Quebec and Ontario 
were to be accounted for by Quebec leading the way on the path of the second 
demographic transition as originally described by van de Kaa (1987), the total 
fertility rate should be lower in Quebec. Of course, one could argue that this 
might simply be a temporary situation, and that fertility should soon be dropping 
in Quebec. But it is also possible to imagine that, although the two processes are 
certainly  related,  the  process  that  leads  from  traditional  to  non-traditional 
beliefs, norms and values relating to sex and the family and the process that 
determines fertility per se may be intrinsically different. The first process would 
be a consequence of  the loss of  legitimacy of the beliefs, norms and values 
inherited from Christianity, and of the will of the people to control such basic 
aspects of  their lives as who  they live with, in  what way and for how  long 
without having to ask any authorities’ permission. The pace of this process in a 
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given society would largely depend on the importance of religion in this society 
and on the relation between the State and the Churches or other religious groups. 
The  second  process  would  be  a  consequence  of  the  first—controlling  one’s 
fertility is contrary to the Christian tradition—to the extent that it gives men and 
women the power to decide whether or not they will have children. However, 
the actual decision to have children and how many would be largely driven by 
practical and contingent circumstances such as the cost of children, the relative 
importance of the woman’s income in the family budget, the availability of child 
care,  and  so  on.  The  more  the  first  process  is  advanced,  and  thus  the  more 
fertility is the consequence of a choice, the more fertility would be influenced by 
practical and contingent circumstances. 
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